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Abstract

commonly used walking pathways of several secret
military installations [3].
As IoT devices have proliferated into the wider
internet to the tune of nearly 10 billion devices [4], the
risks of misuse have also undoubtedly increased in
diversity and likelihood. This comports with the
increasing number of high profile attacks, such as the
Mirai Botnet [5] which briefly shut down access to a
large swath of high traffic websites by coopting and
misusing unprotected digital video recorders (DVRs)
owned by unsuspecting users, and with academic and
industry studies of the IoT threat landscape [6]. These
studies have highlighted several features of wearables
and, more broadly, IoT, such as sensing and
communication capabilities, always-on network
connectivity, and pervasive embedded locations, that
make them particularly vulnerable to attack.
As with other software and hardware design and
development, security in IoT systems is often an
afterthought [7] to getting products to market. The
problem is exacerbated by the paradigmatic
assumptions of IoT – which emphasize low power
hardware, plug-and-play modular design, and low or
no configuration. While many threat analysis and
evaluative testing tools exist for web and networkbased penetration testing [8-10], IoT designers and
developers face a lack of robust evaluative tooling for
examining potential threats that span more than one
component of their product architecture (e.g. an attack
that involves a chain of events from the network, a
phone, an IoT device, and a web site).
This lack of parity between traditional network and
web penetration testing tooling (e.g. Wireshark [8],
Nmap [9] Metasploit [10], etc.), and tooling available
for pen-testing IoT hardware, Bluetooth networks, and
mobile app analysis has largely translated to less time
spent on IoT product security evaluations [6].
This paper develops and documents a set of audit
hooks and data capture mechanisms for accumulating
threat intelligence from multiple sources and
perspectives (e.g. app data, Bluetooth data, web
traffic, etc) and combining it to identify potential
security threats and direct mitigation efforts in IoT.
Using these data capture mechanisms, we augment a
testbed, created in prior work [11], called SecuWear so

The rising ubiquity of the Internet of Things (IoT)
has heralded a new era of increasingly prolific and
damaging IoT-centric security threat vectors. Fastpaced market demand for multi-featured IoT products
urge companies, and their software engineers, to bring
products to market quickly, often at the cost of
security. Lack of proper security threat analysis
tooling during development, testing, and release
cycles exacerbate security concerns. In this paper, we
augment a security threat analysis tool to use audit
hooks, open-source information capture components,
and machine learning techniques to profile dynamic
wearable and IoT operations spanning multiple
components during execution. Our tool encourages
data-drive threat identification and analysis
approaches that can help software engineers perform
dynamic testing and threat analysis to mitigate codelevel vulnerabilities that lead to attacks in IoT
applications. Our approach is evaluated by means of
a case study involving a system evaluation across
several common attack vectors.

1. Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) is a term that both refers
to actual devices (i.e. “things” on an internetconnected network) and an architectural paradigm.
Things in the IoT may be as small as a single sensor in
a toaster that sends an alert when the toast is ready to
automobile components that collect, analyze, and
make decisions on real-time driving data, to wearable
watches and other devices that capture human
activities for bio-feedback and exercise tracking
purposes. Depending on the commercial, medical, and
personal use cases, data collected by IoT devices may
be particularly personal (e.g. pacemaker or glucometer
logs) [1] or highly sensitive (e.g. GPS coordinates that
could be used to track user movements) [2]. For
instance, in a widely reported side-channel, GPS
coordinates from the Strava fitness wearables on
military service members made its way onto world
maps, inadvertently revealing the location and
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Figure 1. High-level overview of the SecuWear IoT testbed using audit hooks to gather, accumulate
and analyze data to identify attack scenarios and direct mitigation efforts.
that it is capable of identifying attacks in IoT systems
which include one or more IoT devices, an androidbased mobile application, one or more web services,
and the communication mediums between them, i.e.
Bluetooth / Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) and IP
networks. The testbed design is shown in Figure 1.
Here a particular device is communicating with an
Android app over BLE, using functions foo1 and foo2,
which are subsequently interacting with a RESTful
API in a web service using endpoints bar1 and bar2.
Audit hooks are placed in each function on the app,
endpoint on the webservice, and on passive network
listening tools – including an Ubertooth (a low-cost,
open source, Bluetooth monitoring hardware device)
and a network tap feeding data to WireShark. The
design and placement of the audit hooks allow them to
operate in real-time as an application executes to
capture ephemeral events and internal data that may
exist only within the scope of the function and/or for
the duration of the process. The testbed gathers events,
pools them with other data gathered from other
components in the architecture and creates event traces
of execution that can be used to profile normalcy,
identify potentially adherent behavior that may be
associated with known attack vectors, and/or detect
new types of attacks. In this sense, SecuWear is a
testbed that facilitates dynamic testing during
development or monitoring, when an app has been
deployed to production. Analysis in SecuWear is app
specific since the data gathered may vary between
applications. More information about the audit hooks
and analysis techniques is provided in Section 3.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 reviews relevant literature. Section 3
describes the design model of the tool, the design
decisions underlying the developed audit hooks, the

process followed to pull information gained from audit
hooks together with other sources of information such
as that from Ubertooth, Web servers, and network
data. Section 4 demonstrates the feasibility of
differentiating between behaviors associated with
attack and normal operations of a real-world IoT
system. A case study involving an IoT device, an
Android App, and an advertisement web server is used
in the demonstration. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. Background
2.1. Security concerns in IoT and wearables
Security weaknesses in IoT arise due to range of
root causes related to the functional behavior of the
IoT device in question [11, 12], processes which occur
during operation [7], and the multiple security
domains the devices operation within [13]. Typical
IoT devices interact with higher-powered devices such
as smart phones and web services, as well as other IoT
devices. Interaction often occurs over Bluetooth or
BLE, and Wi-Fi. Given the highly integrated
architecture and low-powered hardware involved in
IoT, the existence of a vulnerability in a connected
app, component, or service, can potentially lead to the
compromise of the IoT device [14]. Wearables devices
are particularly vulnerable due to computational and
power limits [12] which limit the implementation of
strong encryption and authentication protocols. BLE is
susceptible to range of attacks from passive
eavesdropping to active interference [7, 15]. Apps and
devices are also sources of concern given the wide
range of vulnerabilities targeting operating systems
such as the published CVE entries for Android [16].

Page 7147

Gegick and Williams [17], suggest that attacks on
wearables are often based on small and known attacks,
that act as gateways for larger and more sophisticated
attacks. Their work highlights the common, often
unmaintained, stagnancy of IoT device software –
which go unpatched, allowing for vulnerability re-use
by attackers. Design flaws are also a large source of
concern [18]. These flaws emerge, among other
reasons, due to poor consideration of security
requirements [18]. No matter how secure software
engineers claim their application to be there are always
weaknesses that can be exploited to break in.
Appropriate evaluative tooling has also been identified
as a critical pre-requisite for secure software [12].

2.2. Multi-component threat analysis system
Multi-component threat analysis (MCA) is a
system-spanning activity that identifies and profiles
potential threats which may span one or more
components in the system. IoT applications often
incorporate many components and services, making
MCA a critical part of overall system evaluation.
Siboni et al. [12] developed a security testbed
framework for MCA of wearable applications. Their
approach examines a wide range of wearable devices
that transmit data through variety of communication
channels including WiFi, Zigbee and Bluetooth. Their
framework enables security testing based on memory
consumption, CPU utilization, and the file system of
the device during context-based attacks (when
different simulators maliciously trigger internal
sensors) and data attacks (when external signals and
data manipulate the sensors). It spans components,
considers device activities upon identifying a threat,
but does not collect or monitor real-time event traces
and does not identify application level vulnerabilities.
Intrusion detection, and intrusion detection
systems (IDS), are related concepts within the scope of
MCA which focus, specifically, on the identification
of threats in real-time data – often for the purpose of
mitigating or preventing threat-actors from conducting
network-based attacks [19]. Zhang et al. [20] presents
an IDS architecture for examining and preventing
attacks in mobile wireless networks. Their architecture
is based on an ad-hoc routing protocol which discovers
the network topology of a wireless network and then
monitors it to build notions of normality. While their
approach is useful for detecting anomalies in mobile
wireless networks environments, it does not identify
threats spanning component boundaries in IoT.
Across MCA research in IoT, much work has
focused on network-data [20] spanning components,
but little has been done to extract disparate, differently
tiered data from the components themselves to analyze

the security posture of the overall system [21]. One
potential in-roads towards component-based MCA in
IoT are audit hooks. Audit hooks are small functional
insertions that occur within programs and functions
that allow components to pass operational information
up to an, often central, auditor. Audit hooks have been
used and studied extensively within the web services
community as a means to examine and track security
behavior across service compositions [22]. Here, a
central auditor collects information from contributing
audit hooks, combines the information to synthesize
an analysis to determine if the composition is meeting
its service requirements (or service levels), and then
alerts stakeholders if the constraints are not met [22].
Others in the IoT MCA research community have
highlighted audit hooks as options for IoT systems
[23], but to our knowledge no frameworks make wide
usage of audit hooks to integrate data across multiple
disparate components and differing abstractions in IoT
architectures (e.g. data arising from functional
execution of code on smartphones, connected
webservices, and the IoT device hardware).

2.3. Identifying attacks with machine learning
Using machine learning (ML) to identify attacks is
not a new concept. The earliest application we found
was in 1975, where Carlstedt et al. [17] abstracted
system calls, data stores and other entities in operating
system source code into generalized patterns and used
them to find security flaws. They used concepts such
as finite state automata (FSA) to show that sequence
of events could result in an attack in practice.
Graphical structures such as attack trees, attack nets
were also proposed for threat identification.
More advanced ML approaches including
classifiers [20, 24] have been used by intrusion
detection systems to differentiate between different
types of traffic according to signatures of behavior.
For instance, Zhang, Lee, and Huang, [20] apply two
classification models: (i) RIPPER and (ii) SVM-light
to separate data into attack or non-attack classes in
mobile ad-hoc networks. Their approach relies on
attack patterns to characterize and train their models.
The efficacy of attack patterns and model-based threat
detection is predicated on the notion that normal and
intrusion activities have distinct and detectable
behaviors [20]. Attack patterns, in this sense, are class
attributes (features) that exist during attack scenarios.
ML algorithms utilize these attack patterns and
classify data into either one of the classes based on
presence or absence of known patterns.
Buczak and Guven [24] survey and explore how
various ML approaches can be used for cyber security
applications. Among others, they examined
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applications of artificial neural networks, Bayesian
networks, support vector machine, and decision trees
for classification of security data into classes
associated with attack patterns. For each approach,
they provide and apply typical ML comparison criteria
such accuracy, positive prediction value (or precision),
sensitivity, and specificity, to security problems. Their
work highlights the role of ML for security problems
such as anomaly detection and misuse case detection.
In addition, they identify the following steps in using
ML for security-related data:
- Clean and prepare data into test and training sets.
- Identify class attributes (features) from the
training set to characterize attack patterns.
- Identify the subset of attributes necessary for
classification (i.e. dimensionality reduction).
- Train the model on the features.
- Using trained model to classify samples in test set.
- Measure and evaluate model.

3. Audit Hooks for Dynamic IoT Testing
The design of the SecuWear testbed makes
extensive use of developer-customizable audit hooks
inserted into different method, components, and
network channels within the architecture of an IoT
app. The audit hooks serve to intercept function calls,
messages, or events passed between software
components and must exist within and across
components to capture interactions and transmissions
as they occur in IoT devices or wearables and
collaborating smartphones and web services. The audit
hooks can operate on a real-time basis and capture data
that might exist only in an internal form or only for the
duration of the process. Appropriate placement of
audit hooks is critical to detecting anomalies. Once
events are captured, they are fed into a centralized
server. The server combines events gathered from
multiple perspectives (e.g. function data, device data,
packet data, etc) and compiles it into an event trace to
prepare it for analysis, before finally producing a
vulnerability analysis report with any findings. The
schema for events in the trace is shown in Figure 2.
Eventitem:
created: datetime
domain: string
eventtype: string
event: string
codereference: string
data: string
size: string
run: integer
Figure 2. Schema used for events in the trace

Each event item in the trace includes the fields:
created which is a unix timestamp identifying when
the event was captured; domain which identifies where
the event originated (can take on the discrete values
such as IoT device, mobile app, web or identifiers for
the underlying networks); eventtype is a high level
category of events which exist within a domains (e.g.
“function execution” or “error handler”); event is the
specific type of event that exists within the eventtype
category (e.g. “foo invoked”); codereference is the
specific line of code where the event originated; data
is a field which allows for more specific information
such as an error log or I/O data related to the event to
be logged (e.g. packet information on a network-based
event); size is the size of data and is mostly used for
binary data (such as network traffic); finally, run is the
event trace the event item exists within.
In this section, we discuss the design decisions that
led to the creation of the audit hooks, the process the
audit hooks and analysis server follow to pool,
aggregate, and synthesize event traces, and the specific
series of steps developers must follow to use the audit
hooks and testbed to analyze an application of interest.

3.1. Audit hook requirements
Several requirements guided the creation of the
audit hooks: (1) they must be applicable across
differing apps, (2) they must be useful regardless of
the IoT/wearable device being evaluated, (3) they
must capture a range of information to characterize
behavior across the entirety of an IoT system
architecture, and (4) they must support event-trace
analysis techniques.

3.2. Designing the hooks
To meet these requirements, we created three
separate types of audit hooks, one for passive
Bluetooth network taps, one for smartphone apps
(particularly for usage in the functions interacting with
wearable or IoT hardware), and one for insertion into
any potentially collaborating web services. Each hook
type is reviewed below.
The first type of hook, for gathering Bluetooth
data, sits on top of the open-source Ubertooth project.
Ubertooth comes out of the box with an embedded
driver and command line interface (CLI) capable of
capturing packets on Bluetooth and BLE networks.
Captured packets are converted automatically by the
Ubertooth firmware into a Wireshark-ready format
(PCAP) that is typical of network traffic analysis. Our
audit hook intercedes on the Ubertooth firmware to
collect and send captured packet data to the SecuWear
aggregation server (where other event data is
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gathered). This particular hook was developed using a
Python library called PyShark [25]. Ubertooth
captures data including the advertising header of the
packet, mac addresses for source and target, BLE
protocol type, and the specific data for transmission.
These data broadly and narrowly characterize the
communication behaviors of an IoT system of interest.
Packet data is widely researched, so alone, this is not
a novel invention. The novelty of using Ubertooth data
is in its combination with data from other audit hooks.
The second kind of audit hook is useful within apps
on smartphones exchanging information with a
wearable or IoT device. This kind of hook
characterizes the specific temporal ordering of
functional execution and data operations on the phone
related to data from the wearable or IoT device. This
type of hook, referred to henceforth by its classname
AppHook was developed for Android using the opensource OkHttp [26] library. OkHttp provides utilities
for making HTTP requests and handling the responses.
AppHooks allow software developers to instantiate the
event schema in Figure 2 with data specific to their
application, such as data arising from functional
execution in a function of interest in their architectural
design. The AppHook class, shown in Figure 3,
encapsulates event logging to the SecuWear server.
To use an AppHook, a developer needs only to
import the class, decide where they wish to log
information in their app, instantiate the AppHook class
by calling its constructor (lines 12-14) and passing it
the url where the SecuWear aggregation server is
running, and then call the logEvent method (lines 1631 in Figure 3) at the chosen location, passing it the
information they wish to log. In most cases the
SecuWear testbed is run locally, meaning the url
would be http://localhost/api/events/, if the developer
wishes to capture information after an app has gone
into production, they would host SecuWear online and
then use the url where the platform is running. Any
information deemed relevant can be passed to
logEvent as specified in the schema in Figure 2.
The third type of hook allows developers to log
information arising from connected web services, such
as internal information communicated to it by the app,
or other functions executing on aggregate data on the
web server. For web requests, SecuWear provides a
web-platform agnostic API endpoint for logging data.
The API format conforms to JSONAPI standard [27]
and exposes the event schema in Figure 2. The
SecuWear event logging API is web service platform
agnostic (meaning it works with any webserver of
interest). As an example, we implemented a method,
using the Httplib2 [28] library an open-source HTTP
client library for Python, which can be used by Pythonbased webservers, such as Django [29] to log

information of interest. The example implementation
is shown in Figure 4. This script exemplifies API
invocation and would look similar (albeit with
different library usage) for other web application
server languages.
import
import
import
import
import
import

okhttp3.Call;
okhttp3.Callback;
okhttp3.FormBody;
okhttp3.Request;
okhttp3.OkHttpClient;
okhttp3.RequestBody;

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
public class AppHook {
8
String secuwear_endpoint = "";
9
OkHttpClient client;
10
11
AppHook (String api_url){
12
secuwear_endpoint = api_url;
13
client = new OkHttpClient();
14
}
15
public void logEvent(Long time, String e, String type, 16
String ref, String size, String data)
17
{
18
RequestBody body = new FormBody.Builder()
19
.add("created", time.toString())
20
.add("eventtype", type)
21
.add("event", e )
22
.add("codereference", ref)
23
.add("size", size)
24
.add("data", data)
25
.add("domain", "Mobile")
26
.build();
27
28
Request request = new Request.Builder();
29
request.url(secuwear_endpoint).post(body).build();
30
}
31
}
32

Figure 3. Mobile app audit hook in Android
import time
import httplib2
import urllib

1
2
3
4
def webHook(url, time, event, type, coderef, size, data): 5
payload = {
6
'created': time.time() * 1000, # convert to ms
7
'eventtype': type,
8
'event': event,
9
'codereference': coderef,
10
'size': size,
11
'data': data,
12
'domain': "WebApp",
13
}
14
body = urllib.urlencode(payload)
15
headers = {'Content-type': 'application/x-www-form16
urlencoded'}
17
channel = httlib2.Http()
18
channel.request(url, headers, method="POST", body)
19

Figure 4. Code snippet of web audit hook
All three hook types, i.e. Bluetooth logging,
Mobile AppHooks, and web service audit hooks
(including API information and the example
implementation) have been open sourced and are
available on GitHub. Each hook is, respectively,
available in [30, 31, 32].

3.3. Using the audit hooks in practice
The audit hooks, when taken together capture data
end-to-end across an IoT application architecture. By
collecting data from different perspectives, security
evaluators and software developers can gain insight
into the cross-boundary behaviors of the components
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in their application architecture, identify problem
areas, and direct their mitigation efforts. To use the
testbed, a developer or evaluator needs to inject the
hooks, determine and launch attack scenarios of
interest on the IoT system, and then use SecuWear to
analyze the results to determine if the app was
vulnerable to attack or to discover potential issues.
When injecting the hooks, a developer needs to
determine where to place the audit hooks. Analysis is
only as good as the quality, quantity, and coverage of
data captured in the system. Often, developers have
design documents, software architectures, and risk
assessments that can direct placement to components
of most concern. If developers are unsure about
placement, we recommend injecting a hook into each
method that has sensitive or critical data assets.
The second step in the process involves launching
scenarios of interest to profile the behavior of the
system, as captured by the audit hooks, and construct
a model of correct behavior. Once ‘normal’
operational states are known, the developer can launch
various forms of attacks and observe the system
behavior to determine if problems exist or the system
is vulnerable to attack. In practice, this may mean a
series of tests launched as part of the DevOps process
during development or it may mean monitoring
systems in production to gather more robust test data.
Analyzing the results can be both manual and
automated. In this work, we demonstrate a proof-ofconcept supervised machine learning technique for
training a model on correct and normal system
behaviors and malicious abnormal behaviors
associated with attacks. We then use the model to
determine if attacks have occurred. When attacks are
detected in this way, the event traces which led to
detection can be recalled by the SecuWear analysis
server and presented to the developer or evaluator to
direct mitigation efforts to certain components.

3.4. Modeling normalcy with machine learning
As an example of the types of analysis that can
occur, we explored supervised machine learning
techniques for building classifiers. Here, each model
is trained with labeled data of several types including
normal operational data observed during the typical
operation of the system and operational data gathered
when the system is under some form of attack. In this
paper, we examined four multi-class classification
algorithms: logistic regression, one-vs-one SVM,
multinomial Naïve Bayes, and K-NN to test their
efficacy for determining non-attacks from attacks.
In practice, a developer or security evaluator could
use the classifiers in production or during testing in the
DevOps process (e.g. before releasing a build) by

launching attack scenarios as shown in Figure 1 to
determine if the system is vulnerable to attack. During
development this could highlight abnormal behavior
that could be patched before release. If used in
production, the classifier could serve as a monitor to
detect abnormal behavior and alert the developer to the
potential for misuse. The specifics of our analysis
process are discussed further in the next section.

4. Evaluation
To evaluate the audit hooks in the SecuWear
testbed we used a case study. We applied the audit
hooks to an example IoT system, gathered data about
its operation under attack and normal conditions, and
then used the machine learning techniques introduced
in Section 3 to analyze the results.

4.1. The case
The case for further study is as follows. A
developer is writing code for multi-component IoT
system that includes a fitness tracking wearable with
accelerometer, barometer, and thermistor sensors –
similar to those on a Fitbit. The wearable will send its
data to an Android app which will display recent
accelerometer and temperature data. Bluetooth LE will
be used for communication between the watch and the
app. The app will interface with a webservice to store
historical temperature and accelerometer data over
time for the user to review in aggregate. The Android
app will also display advertisements from a third-party
advertisement provider service.
The wearable watch will be based on a MetaWearC
[33] hardware device, chosen for its open-source API,
low cost, and variety of sensors. The MetaWear C has
an accelerometer, barometer, and thermistor [33],
among other sensors. The developer wants to support
all versions of Android above 6.0.1(Marshmallow) to
support most of the Android market. Figure 5 shows a
component-based system diagram of the proper
operational flow expected by the developer in the case.
As it shows, the developer has chosen to use an
Android WebView [34] to insert web-based
advertisements (i.e. HTML, JavaScript, CSS).

Figure 5: Component-based system diagram
and expected data flow of the case system
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4.2. Attack scenarios in the case
The developer wants to evaluate the system for
potential security vulnerabilities. In this case, the
developed system is vulnerable to two attacks. The
first scenario involves a malicious advertisement that
has made it onto the third-party advertising service.
Similar attacks have been described in [35]. The
advertisement infects devices it is displayed on by
injecting a short JavaScript script into any affected
devices to collect all exposed variables within its
scope and periodically read and send their values to a
malicious logging server. This is an example of data
exfiltration. The system vulnerability which allows for
this attack, called code injection, to occur is that the
system does not properly escape scripts, allowing code
to be loaded and executed at run time. The code
injection attack scenario is shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Code-injection attack allows
malicious JavaScript to exfiltrate sensor data
to an attacker’s server.
The second attack involves misuse of permissions.
In this case, the system exposes all of its variables to
the advertisement web view using an Android
JavaScript interface. This means that the WebView
component in the app has access to the sensor data
from the wearable, the state variables which identify
the url where the fitness aggregator service exists, and
other data in the program. This type of poor permission
handling shows that the app has not implemented least
privilege and has given the code controlling the
advertisement integration more privileges than it
needs allowing it to read and write to variables such as
the sensor values, i.e. the temperature and
accelerometer sensor data from the wearable. In this
attack the malicious advertisement interrupts
communication with the fitness aggregation service by
replacing the web service URL with a new URL which
points to a malicious server. This drastically affects
acts a denial of service – since it prevents the correct
operation of the app. Other similar attacks might rewrite sensor variables affecting data integrity. The
denial of service attack scenario is shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Denial of service and exfiltration
attack prevents normal operation while also
sending data to the attacker’s server.

4.3. Implementation of the case
We implemented the case exactly as described to
evaluate SecuWear and the audit hooks. To realize the
fitness use cases, we forked the open-source
MetaWear Android app [33] on GitHub. This app
already has out-of-the-box code to interact with the
MetaWearC, pull temperature, accelerometer, and
other sensor data from the device, and display it
graphically in the app. We modified the app to have a
WebView which display ads from an advertisement
server. We also modified the app to send its
temperature and accelerometer data to a data
aggregator service. For the data aggregator service, we
setup a simple Django server with two API endpoints
– one that accepts temperature and one that accepts
accelerometer data.
To create the advertising server, we built a small
php server to serve three different advertisements, one
legitimate, two malicious. The vulnerabilities shown
in Figures 6 and 7 were embedded in the MetaWear
app. The two malicious ads on the ads server were
created to respectively exploit each vulnerability.

4.4. Collecting data with the audit hooks
After implementing the case study, we injected the
audit hooks in every function which accessed any
sensitive data, following the process described in
Section 3.3. Next, we launched the advertisement
server and the data aggregation service. Finally, we
turned on the SecuWear server to allow the hooks to
log their events for analysis.
To explore and capture data regarding normal
operations (Figure 5), we launched the app on Android
and told the advertising server to send a legitimate
advertisement to the app. It began communicating
with its advertisement server and its data aggregator
server. We also launched the Ubertooth and its audit
hook, from a physically proximally located device (i.e.
a device in the same room as the wearable and the
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phone). This began collection of Bluetooth network
data and streaming audited events to SecuWear.
Next, we began gathering data for use in our
analysis. Overall, we repeated each scenario (normal,
code injection, denial of service) 25 times. In each
case, we paired the app with the wearable. For the
attack scenarios, we instructed the advertising server
to serve up the appropriate malicious advertisement.
Henceforth, we refer to each repetition of the
scenario as a run. Each run ran the scenario for
approximately two minutes. During those two
minutes, the audit hooks gathered data from each
component in the system. The Ubertooth data was
monitored in WireShark to confirm that a
CONNECT_REQ packet [36] was captured after
pairing. Connection requests are specific packets in
the Bluetooth protocol that signal and initiate the
pairing process. Since Bluetooth LE has 3 channels
where this can occur, the Ubertooth does not always
capture the packet [15]. This can be overcome by using
three Uberteeth. Once connection was confirmed, we
let the run continue for the two minutes. If a
connection was not confirmed, the run was restarted.
At the end of each run, captured events on SecuWear
were arranged chronologically into event traces and
output to a CSV file for analysis.
After capturing 25 runs of each scenario, for a total
of 75 runs, we observed each run had an average of
669 events in their trace, with individual runs having
event totals in the range 305-1,674. In total, this
amounted to 50,249 events.

4.5. Feature Selection
To analyze the data and apply our chosen
supervised machine learning techniques described in
Section 3.4 we went through a series of processes:
dataset cleaning and preparation, feature selection,
division of the data into training and test sets, model
creation, and classifier assessment analysis.
Our data cleaning process consisted of two steps:
1) removed malformed events (this only occurred in
two of the ~45000 total events); 2) remove network
traffic for other devices on the network (i.e. with mac
addresses that do not match the phone or wearable).
To reduce dimensionality and complexity, we
applied a mutual information feature selection
criterion [37] to filter the total available features in the
data to only those related to event and eventTypes.
From the 75-run dataset, we extracted unique
occurrences of various eventtypes and events. The
eventtypes are categories of events that occurred
during the various scenarios.
There are 17 different eventtypes, 2 from the BLE
audit hook captured by Ubertooth – ATT and LE LL.

ATT indicates a packet capture event with ATTribute
data was received. LE LL is also a packet capture
event, but occurs at a lower layer down from ATT. It
usually relates to non-data transfer in Bluetooth. Both
types relate to the BLE protocol used for connection
and data exchange between MetaWear and Android
app. The remaining 14 eventtypes include – ‘Activity
created’, ‘Activity destroyed’, ‘Blte server from
MetaWewar binded’, ‘Chart updated’, ‘Creating user
interface’, ’Interaction with JavaScript’, ’Item
selected’, ’MetaWear board prepared’, ’Reset’,
‘Sensor initialized’, ‘Superclass constructor invoked’,
‘User interface created’, ‘axis setting configured’, and
‘x-axis configured to end’. These types are specific to
the Metawear Android app and relate to different
functions being called as thermometer data was
collected by MetaWear, displayed to the user, and sent
to data aggregator web service.
There were 32 unique events which were grouped
into the various eventTypes across the 75 runs. 11
among them were generated by the BLE channel
across the ATT and LE LL eventTypes. Among the 11
events from BLE channel ‘ADV_IND’ and
‘ADV_DIRECT_IND’ were connectable undirected
and directed advertising events created by the
MetaWear device. ‘ADV_NONCONN_IND’ was a
non-connectable undirected advertising event created
by MetaWear. ‘ADV_SCAN_IND’ was a scannable
undirected advertising event which indicates a device
cannot be connected to but can respond scan requests.
‘SCAN_REQ’ and ‘SCAN_RSP’ were scan requests
sent by the Android device and scan response events
sent back by the MetaWear device. ‘CONNECT_REQ’
was a connection request event sent by the Android
device to connect to MetaWear. The other four were
LLID:0 to LLID:3 were events which occurred during
data exchange between MetaWear and Android and
indicate that Bluetooth variable reads/writes.
The remaining 21 events were generated by the
Android app. Each was of the form ‘<foo> method
executed’ indicating the execution of method foo at
some point during the run. Within this group, we can
classify the 21 events into two classes: 1) interaction
with the JavaScript Interface (e.g. by a webview), and
2) execution of methods for connection and data
exchange (e.g. from the MetaWear or to the
aggregating web service).

4.6. Dataset division and Model creation
We created two models, one based on eventType
categories and one based on events. We set aside 80%
of our data for training and reserved 20% for testing.
To prevent sampling bias, we randomly applied the
80/20 sampling categorically across the three types of
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runs, i.e. 80/20 code injections, 80/20 denial of
service, and 80/20 normal data. This ensured a
representative sample of each categorically group was
present in both the training and test data. Using the
sampled training data, we trained a model using the
event features and a second on the eventType features.

4.7. Case study: Results and discussion
Table 1 contains the average precision and recall
for each ML technique applied over the eventType
feature set. Similarly, Table 2 contains the average
precision and recall for each ML technique applied to
the event features. “Standard” definitions of precision
and recall are used in both tables, defined as follows:
Precision = TP / ( TP + FP )
Recall = TP / ( TP + FN )
where TP is a true positive, FP is a false positive, and
FN is a false negative. To compute average precision
and recall we ran 40 trials using stratified random
sampling to sample from the 75 run dataset – training
each algorithm on the dataset each time and then using
the test set to compute precision and recall. Our
experiment shows that SVM worked best for attack
detection in both datasets, while Naïve Bayes
performed poorly, and the other techniques fell
somewhere in between. It should be noted that since
the model is fine grained, i.e. trained to recognize
different attacks not just attack/non-attack, precision
and recall are fine-grained as well.
Table 1. Average precision obtained from
various classification models on dataset with
frequency of eventTypes

Average
precision
Average
Recall

Logistic
regression

SVM

Naïve
Bayes

K-NN

81%

86%

59%

72%

80%

85%

60%

67%

While the specifics of these attack scenarios and
the efficacy of the ML techniques for attack detection
are interesting, the results of our study lend support
for the use of audit hooks towards capturing
relevant application data to support security
investigations.
The high precision and recall suggest that our
approach could be useful as “one more tool in the
shed” for dynamic security testing. This claim is, as
noted in our methodology, limited to this case.
Generalizing it to larger and other cases may be
possible, but would involve additional study – as we
note later in the limitation discussion below.
Another question we wanted to explore was what
size of data would be required to get results in our case.
To answer this question, we examined the relationship
between training size and false positive / false negative
rates to identify the minimum threshold of sample size
required to train the SVM model and obtain acceptably
stable results. Measuring this, we varied the size of the
training set used to train the SVM model and, for each
size, computed the average false positive and negative
rates. Figure 8 display these results graphically. From
the graph we can see that, at least for this data, training
set sizes with at least 30 runs provided moderate
results, but larger sizes are certainly desirable. From
this data, it is reasonable to suggest that the criticality
of the software/system under test could reasonably
govern the choice of training set size. For low
criticality systems, a smaller training set (less data
collection time) might be justifiable. The results show
that the data obtained by audit hooks can be efficiently
used to generate models and classify attacks from nonattacks. Almost all attack scenarios are detected, with
average precision of no less than 86%. It should be
noted that although our model was trained after the
various data capture runs, the model could operate in
real-time to detect and report threats as they emerge.

Table 2. Average precision obtained from
various classification models on dataset with
frequency of events

Average
precision
Average
Recall

Logistic
regression

SVM

Naïve
Bayes

K-NN

73%

88%

67%

75%

73%

83%

67%

68%

Figure 8: False positive and false negative
rates vs training set size in SVM

Page 7154

5. Limitations and conclusion
Our multi-component security analysis audit hooks
provide knowledge that spans component boundaries.
While this can be illustrative and helpful for
identifying component-spanning attack vectors and
vulnerabilities, it comes at a cost. That cost is the need
to insert audit hooks in each function of interest. This
constitutes a non-trivial amount of DevOps time. This
limitation could be mitigated with tool support that
encourages developers to insert audit hooks during the
development process – instead of as an afterthought.
In addition to this, our results are limited by the
number of cases studied, the number of attacks
explored, and the size of the dataset considered in the
evaluation. These factors suggest that the reader
should be careful not to overly generalize the results.
Taken for what it is, the case study provides a proofof-concept that the data captured by audit hooks in IoT
systems can be used for ML and classification in
support of security analysis and weakness mitigation.
Future work will focus on generalizability to
explore how well the results hold for other cases and
contexts. We also look forward to using the audit
hooks to support additional helpful features for
security evaluation such as mining collected event data
to isolate vulnerable components and make mitigation
suggestions for resolving potential security issues.
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